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ABSTRACT: An intuitive view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement says 
that when epistemic peers disagree, they should suspend judgment. This abstemious 
view seems to embody a kind of detachment appropriate for rational beings; moreover, it 
seems to promote a kind of conciliatory inclination that makes for irenic and cooperative 
further discussion. Like many strategies for cooperation, however, the abstemious view 
creates opportunities for free-riding. In this essay, the authors argue that the believer 
who suspends judgment in the face of peer disagreement is vulnerable to a kind of 
manipulation on the part of more tenacious peers. The result is that the abstemious view 
can have the effect of encouraging dogmatism. 
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Two people, Alf and Betty, disagree. Alf believes that p, and Betty believes that 
not-p. Suppose that Alf and Betty are epistemic peers – they share roughly the 
same evidence and neither is more intellectually capable than the other in any 
substantive way. Also, allow that Alf and Betty have discussed thoroughly each 
other’s reasons, but neither has been moved. 
This circumstance is troubling for Alf and Betty, and not just for practical 
purposes (perhaps they’d like to resolve their disagreement because they have 
plans that depend upon their agreement with respect to p) but also for epistemic 
purposes. For each, the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees calls into question the 
quality of the reasons supporting their respective beliefs. Even though neither can 
say precisely where the other has gone wrong, they nevertheless each hold that 
the other’s case does not yield reason to justify the other’s belief. 
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Richard Feldman1 has argued for the intuitive view that under circumstances 
where one is an apparently reasonable believer and affirms a proposition that an 
epistemic peer denies, one should suspend judgment: 
One of us must be making some kind of mistake or failing to see some truth. But 
I have no basis for thinking that the one making the mistake is him rather than 
me. And the same is true of him. And in that case, the right thing for both of us 
to do is suspend judgment on P 2.  
According to Feldman, although there seem to be reasonable disagreements 
among epistemic peers – viz., disagreements where each party is within his or her 
epistemic rights to hold his or her respective view – this is in fact an illusion. 
Consequently, in cases where it appears that one is reasonably disagreeing with a 
peer, one “should suspend judgment about the matter under dispute.”3 Hence 
Feldman holds the principle of suspension: 
(PS) If S disagrees with an epistemic peer about p, then S should suspend 
judgment about p. 
The case for PS depends on a principle regulating evidence which Feldman 
calls The Uniqueness Thesis:  
(UT) A body of evidence justifies at most one proposition of a competing set of 
propositions and... it justifies at most one attitude toward any proposition.4  
The rationale for UT is, we think, also intuitive: A body of evidence either 
supports p or it does not. And if it does, one is justified in believing that p on the 
basis of that evidence. But if not, one is either justified in believing not-p (or some 
specific competing proposition exclusive of p supported by the evidence), or one 
should suspend judgment with regard to p. Feldman takes peer disagreement to 
place believers under an obligation to justify their preference for their own belief 
over their peers; consequently, disagreement among peers gives rise to extra 
epistemic burdens. And in cases of disagreement among peers, believers have no 
                                 
1 Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: 
Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise Antony (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 194-214, and “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and 
Disagreement,” Episteme 6 (2009): 294-312. 
2 Feldman, “Reasonable,” 212. 
3 Feldman, “Reasonable,” 212. 
4 Feldman, “Reasonable,” 205. 
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non-question-begging way to provide the required justificatory story since, by 
hypothesis, the disagreeing peers share all the same evidence and are equally 
capable cognitive agents. Consequently, Feldman holds that “a peer that disagrees 
with you is evidence against the view you believe.”5 Thus, Feldman concludes, 
when faced with a disagreeing peer, one must suspend judgment. 
The view Feldman espouses here is intuitively attractive, and is a member 
of a broad family of views regarding the epistemology of disagreement one may 
characterize as epistemic abstemiousness. The abstemious view is roughly that if 
one finds oneself in disagreement with another that is ostensibly neither better 
nor less informed on the issue, then one has evidence of equal weight between 
two inconsistent propositions. Consequently, one should abstain from belief – that 
is, suspend judgment. In precisely this idiom, Sextus Empiricus took disagreement 
to be its own autonomous skeptical mode: 
According to the mode deriving from dispute, we (the skeptics) find that 
undecidable dissention about the matter proposed as come about both in 
ordinary life and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able either to 
choose or rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgment.6 
Versions of epistemic abstemiousness are commonly found in discussion of 
theological diversity in the philosophy of religion. For example, William Cantwell 
Smith has argued on moral grounds that one has a cognitive duty of intellectual 
humility:  
[E]xcept at the cost of insensitivity or delinquency, it is morally not possible 
actually to go out into the world and say to devout, intelligent, fellow human 
beings: ‘... we believe we know God, and we are right; you believe you know 
God, and you are wrong.’7  
John Hick has argued similarly: 
                                 
5 Feldman, “Evidentialism,” 331. 
6 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), PH I.165. 
7 Wilfred Cantwell-Smith, Religious Diversity (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 14. 
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Nor can we reasonably claim that our own form of religious experience, together 
with that of the tradition of which we are a part, is veridical whilst others are 
not.8 
And Gary Gutting contends that once one has been made aware of 
disagreement regarding a religious belief, one’s epistemic duties increase – one 
must not only be justified in believing, but one must be able to account for the fact 
of the disagreement. According to Gutting, in the face of unresolved disagreement, 
one must dampen one’s commitment: one must withdraw decisive assent and 
extend to one’s belief only interim assent.9 
Abstemiousness has been recommended by philosophers working outside of 
philosophy of religion as well. Keith Lehrer has argued that disagreements 
between genuine inquirers are rationally impossible: 
Actual disagreement among experts must result either from an incomplete 
exchange of information, individual dogmatism, or a failure to grasp the 
mathematical implications of their initial state and yet disagree.10  
Crispin Wright’s account of cognitive command entails a similar result. A 
discourse has cognitive command when, if given differing opinions on a matter in 
the discourse, one knows a priori the divergence must be explainable in terms of 
at least one of the views having an imperfection of pedigree. Accordingly, when 
cognitive command is present a “cognitive shortcoming always has to be at work 
in the generation of conflicting views.”11  
In contemporary discussions of the epistemology of disagreement, the 
connection between what Bogardus12 and others13 have called the equal weight 
view and the conciliatory inclinations we see in abstemiousness is widely 
recognized. Christensen holds that in cases of peer disagreement one should often 
                                 
8 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 2nd Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2004), 235.  
9 Gary Gutting, Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University 
Press, 1982), 105. 
10 Keith Lehrer, “When Rational Disagreement is Impossible,” Nous 10 (1976): 331. 
11 Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 147; Cf. 
Crispin Wright, “On Being in a Quandary. Relativism vagueness logical revisionism,” Mind 
110 (2001): 58. 
12 Tomas Bogardus, “A Vindication of the Equal Weight View,” Episteme 6 (2009): 324-335. 
13 Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Nous 41 (2007): 478-502, Roger White, “On 
Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers,” Episteme 6 (2009): 233-50. 
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“split the difference.”14 Earl Conee holds that when faced with a mature dispute 
between mutually recognized epistemic peers, even when one is one of the 
disputants, one must take a third-person view of the situation and reason:  
Either way, we are justified in thinking that minds having equally good prospects 
of finding out the truth about X are on each side. In light of this, the reasons we 
have been given for and against X remain in balance.15 
This is because, from the disinterested view, “we have no better basis for 
discounting opposing summary impressions than we do for our own.”16  
As we have said, it is intuitive to think that when we find ourselves 
disagreeing with an epistemic peer, we must abstain from belief. The abstemious 
view seems to capture a kind of detachment requisite for rational beings and a 
kind of conciliatory inclination that makes for irenic discussion. Feldman’s 
articulation of the abstemious view seems to us the most explicit version yet 
proposed. But is it correct? We think not. In fact, we shall argue that, despite its 
initial intuitive appeal, the abstemious view yields results that are highly 
counterintuitive. 
Return to our peers who disagree, Alf and Betty. Assume Betty accepts 
Feldman’s PS and so reasons as follows:  
Because Alf is an epistemic peer who disagrees with me with respect to p, I must 
suspend judgment with respect to p.  
And then Betty suspends. But note that this introduces a drastic shift in the 
epistemic situation that obtains between Alf and Betty. Betty originally held that 
not-p, but now, just with a bit of discussion, Betty has weakened her belief that 
not-p to suspension with respect to p; she has become an epistemic abstainer with 
respect to p, we may say. The fact of Betty’s abstention is relevant to Alf in two 
ways. First, once Betty suspends judgment, Alf no longer has a disagreement with 
Betty of the kind that would engage PS with respect to p. So Alf can sustain his 
belief that p. To be sure, there is still a disagreement between Alf and Betty, but 
now it is a disagreement concerning whether to suspend judgment regarding p 
(Betty will present this new disagreement to Alf shortly). Second, note that part of 
what compels Betty to epistemically abstain is her observation that an epistemic 
                                 
14 David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 
116 (2007): 203. 
15 Earl Conee, “Peerage,” Episteme 6 (2009): 315. 
16 Conee, “Peerage,” 322. 
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peer, Alf, stays adamant in his belief that p; but if Betty must take Alf’s 
immovability about p as evidence about the insufficiency of her own evidence, 
then Alf may likewise take Betty’s movability as evidence in favor of the strength 
of his evidence. We imagine Alf reasoning as follows: 
If a peer’s disagreement is enough to defeat one’s reasons, then my peer’s 
movement from full-bore disagreement to suspension of judgment should also be 
an indicator of the (insufficient) quality my peer’s reasons.  
In other words, because Alf does not blink, Betty must suspend judgment; 
and because Betty suspends judgment, Alf may have even more evidence for his 
view. Once Betty suspends, Alf has one fewer epistemic peer who believes not-p, 
precisely because of her concerns that she had no reason to hold she was not in 
error. And so, in following PS, Betty moves from being an epistemic abstainer to 
being an epistemic martyr, all because of Alf’s immovability. 
Something has gone awry. It seems that Alf isn’t playing fair – Alf improves 
his epistemic position by simply waiting for Betty to weaken her view. In refusing 
to apply PS, Alf is being an epistemic free-rider. So let us imagine that Betty calls 
foul. Betty says, “Alf, you must suspend judgment with respect to p, too!” But 
notice that we now have moved the disagreement from (i) whether p to (ii) what 
the proper propositional attitude toward p should be. Alf holds that he is justified 
in believing that p, and Betty holds that Alf should suspend judgment. But, now, 
Feldman’s view would require Betty to apply PS to this (new) disagreement. That 
is, Betty must suspend judgment about whether Alf must suspend judgment with 
regard to p. And so Betty must weaken her claim that Alf is breaking an epistemic 
rule to a suspension of judgment with respect to Alf’s rule following. Additionally, 
it seems that because Betty and Alf disagree about the application of PS, Betty 
should suspend judgment about whether she should suspend judgment about p. 
The discussion between Alf and Betty may then go on like this for several 
rounds, and potentially forever. At each level, Betty will not have a substantive 
reason for holding that Alf is unreasonable for sustaining his belief. And she will 
have reason to suspend judgment about the propriety of her previous abstemious 
moves. Betty, given Alf’s disagreement on each level, will be unable to hold 
positively that Alf is wrong and she is right on any of the levels. She only can 
stammer in disbelief, immobilized and in a state of perpetual epistemic suspension. 
Reminding Alf of PS, if Alf is tenacious, only deepens Betty’s martyrdom. 
Meanwhile, things continue to get better for Alf. He is, by his lights at least, 
prima facie justified in his belief that p, and further, there are now no peers who 
dissent. So Betty, following the standing evidence and the social reflections on the 
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quality of that evidence, should now come to believe p. That is, Betty, although 
presently in suspense, should see that Alf believes p unopposed. Betty should 
reason thusly:  
Since dissent among peers is a defeater, the absence of peer dissent with respect 
to p improves the case for p.  
So Betty should come to believe that p. That is, if peer disagreement is 
enough to overturn Betty’s originally well-thought out reasons, they must, absent 
her own defeating reasons, be good enough for warrant her assent. Feldman, 
remember, had argued that peer disagreement is a reason to suspend judgment 
precisely because the peer’s contrary beliefs stand as evidence that the subject’s 
view is false17 Betty, now that there is no contrary evidence to Alf’s view, as she 
has suspended belief with regard to p, now has evidence that not-p is true. She 
should proportion her belief to her evidence. And so Betty rises from her 
epistemic martyrdom, but now as an epistemic convert. 
Surely Betty will find this abstention-to-martyrdom-to-conversion 
experience puzzling. And we do, too. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how such 
contortions could be a sign of epistemic responsibility (to say nothing of psychological 
health). The simple fact of Alf’s tenacity produces for Betty a sufficient reason for 
her to adopt his view. Thus Betty’s epistemic virtue must succumb to Alf’s 
epistemic vice.  
Perhaps then we should rule out free-riders by revising Feldman’s view to 
say that PS applies only in cases in which both parties to a disagreement 
reciprocally suspend judgment. This requirement of reciprocity among epistemic 
peers may avoid the dizzying shift from martyr to convert; however, it also 
suggests that PS cannot serve as a response to all cases of disagreement between 
epistemic peers. In particular, it fails in just those deep disagreements that 
generate the problem of peer disagreement in the first place. Deep disagreement 
arises when neither party can agree on the proper attitude to take towards p or 
how to further arbitrate what divides them. In such cases, it will not help if one of 
the parties suspends judgment with regard to p, because this will simply relocate 
the disagreement: What was once a disagreement about whether p becomes a 
disagreement about whether to suspend judgment with respect to p. As we have 
already seen, one can remain committed to PS in such cases only on pains of 
becoming an epistemic martyr and ultimately a convert.  
                                 
17 Richard Feldman, “Evidentialism,” 331. 
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Epistemic martyrdom occurs in cases in which PS is applied asymmetrically, 
but something similar occurs even when PS is applied symmetrically. If both sides 
apply PS when a second-order disagreement arises, all believers will be martyred 
to suspense, for suspenders dictate the epistemic requirements in the situation for 
all involved. To see this, let us view the second order disagreement from the 
perspective of Charles. Charles disagrees with Betty about p, just like Alf does. 
And Charles disagrees with Betty over the propriety of belief or suspension with 
regard to p. However, with this second-order disagreement, he abides by PS. So 
Charles suspends judgment with regard to suspending judgment with regard to p. 
But it seems to Charles that this is simply to suspend judgment with regard to p. 
He reasons that one could not both believe that p and suspend judgment with 
regard to whether to suspend judgment with regard to p. According to PS, then, 
any believer must suspend belief in the face of any peer who suspends judgment. 
One could avoid this worst-case outcome only by denying that Charles must 
suspend with regard to p when he suspends with regard to suspending about p. 
But this seems inconsistent with overtly holding that p: if Charles thinks he is 
holding that p justifiably, he would not suspend judgment about whether he 
should suspend judgment. That is, he should think it false that he should suspend 
judgment. But since he has suspended judgment about whether he should suspend 
judgment, he, it seems, has undone his belief. 
In short, if everybody plays by Feldman’s rules, or those articulated by the 
broader versions of epistemic abstemiousness, those who suspend judgment with 
regard to any issue will dictate the epistemic duties of all their peers. Imagine a 
group of epistemic peers who all believe that p. Now introduce to that group an 
epistemic peer who suspends judgment with regard to p. On Feldman’s abstemious 
principles, the entire group must now suspend judgment, regardless of how deeply 
held the belief is. To Charles, this has the appearance of submitting his deeply 
held beliefs to the whims of those who suspend their beliefs at the first whiff of 
disagreement. For better or worse, all is not lost for the believers. Simply add to 
the group an epistemic peer who ignores this application of PS and stalwartly 
continues on with her belief that not-p. For reasons we provided above, the entire 
group would now have reason to convert to the stalwart’s view. So Feldman’s 
epistemically reasonable believers become martyrs, and the tenacious win easy 
converts. The trouble with PS, and abstemiousness more broadly, is that, in spite 
of its broad-minded intentions and overtly anti-dogmatic aim, it recommends 
dogmatism. 
This is indeed a troubling result. PS is intuitively appealing precisely 
because the alternative of dogmatically holding on to one’s belief in spite of peer 
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disagreement seems unreasonable. One need not be an unscrupulous epistemic 
free-rider in search of easy converts, however, to think that dogmatism is 
preferable to becoming an epistemic martyr. The requirement that one subject 
oneself to epistemic martyrdom – or even worse, conversion – simply because of 
peer disagreement seems far too demanding. Our deeply held beliefs are not the 
sorts of things that we can simply give up on at a moment’s notice. We suspect 
that part of what belief is to be committed to it in way that prevents one from 
seeing it as so easily disposable. It is hard then to be committed to PS while 
maintaining one’s integrity as a believer. We are concerned that this is the case for 
abstemious commitments across the board. But our cautionary tales above suggest 
that Feldman’s PS – and perhaps epistemic abstemiousness as such – is deeply at 
odds with how we view ourselves as cognitive agents.  
